- Information Aggregation under Correlation Neglect: A Multi-Source Media Framework (with Jeongbin Kim)
- This paper develops a general framework for information aggregation under bounded redundancy recognition (BRR), a behavioral bias in which voters under-discount repeated signals and neglect cross-source correlation.
- Information Disclosure when Sellers Know Buyers
- This paper develops a theory of platform competition where sellers possess superior information about buyer preferences. We analyze how platforms strategically disclose this information in competitive settings,
- A Knowledge-Based Economy with Consulting
- We extend the knowledge-based hierarchy framework to an economy where a consulting sector pools scarce expertise across firms. The consulting layer emerges endogenously when team efficiency per wage in consulting exceeds that of a firm’s internal top worker, yielding a clean internal–external cutoff for task assignment and improving aggregate welfare by reallocating rare, high-difficulty problems.
- Overconfidence and Optimal Information Design
- People often think they will read and react to information later, but then do not. We study how a designer should structure disclosures when agents are overconfident about their future attention.